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ARGUMENT 
SmartBargains' arguments are factually intense - but made without record facts. 
Summary judgment requires an undisputed fact record - but material fact disputes 
appear. Indeed, SmartBargains fails even to carry its initial burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a fact dispute. This prerequisite for summary judgment is missing. 
Utah case law shows that SmartBargains' use of similar color, design, and pattern 
in its pop-ups gives rise to a cause of action for unfair competition. The intent behind the 
pop-ups, the disclaimers on the pop-ups, the conduct related to the pop-ups, and the effect 
of the pop-ups are all disputed. The WhenU cases are distinguishable because they are 
based on their own separate fact records. The common law of unfair competition governs 
this internet case just as it does in the world of brick and mortar. For equivalent reasons, 
Overstock's tortious interference claim should move forward along with its unfair 
competition claim. 
Additionally, Overstock was entitled to complete discovery. This was thwarted by 
SmartBargains. The Rule 56(f) motion therefore should not have been denied. 
For these reasons, summary judgment was improperly granted and should be 
reversed. 
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPERLY GRANTED. 
A. Summary judgment requires an undisputed material fact record. 
It is black-letter law that summary judgment is only appropriate in the absence of a 
material fact dispute. That sine qua non is missing here. 
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1. SmartBargains' arguments are factual, disputed, and/or unsupported 
by the record. 
SmartBargains' arguments advanced in support of its position are inherently 
factual. A large number of those factual arguments have no basis in the record. Others 
are disputed. The following examples from SmartBargains' brief, with citations to the 
relevant page number, illustrate: 
• No record evidence supports SmartBargains' argument that its pop-ups are "like 
all pop-up advertisements computer users regularly receive." (p. 17) 
• No record evidence supports SmartBargains' argument that "computer users 
understand how windows and pop-up advertisements work." (p.27) 
• No record evidence supports SmartBargains' argument that its pop-ups "appear 
like any other browser window and can be moved, closed, minimized or 
maximized." (p. 17) 
• No record evidence was presented of what a "browser window," "window 
browser," or "internet browser" is or how any such software operated in 
connection with these pop-ups. (pp.16, 17, 30 n.l 1) 
• No record evidence was presented to support the conclusion that any such 
"browser" is "separate from the underlying Web Site." (p. 16) 
• No record evidence was presented to identify or explain the "Zango Search 
Assistant," the use of which SmartBargains argues in support of its motion, (p. 16) 
• No record evidence was presented to identify or explain the "GAIN Network," the 
use of which SmartBargains argues in support of its motion, (p. 16) 
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• SmartBargains argues, without any consumer evidence, that its ads "do not 
deceive consumers as to their source." (p. 17) 
• SmartBargains argues that its pop-ups "never appear directly below Overstock's 
name." (p.22 n.8.) The record shows otherwise. (R.538.) 
• SmartBargains argues that its pop-ups carry its corporate name, not the phrase 
"smart bargains." (p.22 n.8.) But its corporate name is "SmartBargains, Inc.," a 
moniker that does not appear anywhere on the pop-ups. (R.7, 538; Aplee. Br. at 
1.) A reasonable person looking at the pop-up sees "smart" and "bargains" in two 
different colors - the same colors used on Overstock's website - suggesting two 
words, not one. (R.7, 538.) This is highlighted further by the use of all small case 
letters, suggesting a phrase rather than a company. (R.7.) In contrast, the 
SmartBargains corporate name uses upper case "S" and "B." (Aplee. Br, at 1.) 
Without the deliberately-left-off "Inc.," the smartbargains® mark, placed in close 
proximity to the Overstock name, gives no indication of a separate company. 
(R.7, 538.) 
• SmartBargains argues without record evidence that Overstock's color scheme on 
its website was "ever changing." (p.23 n.9) 
• SmartBargains argues that its color scheme "may have coincidentally been 
similar." (p.23 n.9) A jury would like to hear this less-than-convincing 
explanation, made without an affidavit, of how SmartBargains' color scheme came 
to exactly match with Overstock's. 
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• SmartBargains argues that its ads do not "appear to be part of Overstock's Web 
site" (despite conceding a similar color scheme and facially similar format), 
(p. 17) Appearance is inherently factual. See Drexel Enters. Inc. v. Richardson, 
312 F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1962) (similarity is a question of fact). 
In short, the decision below was premised on fact-based contentions that are 
heavily disputed and/or have no record support. Summary judgment is not the proper 
procedure for deciding such a fact-intensive dispute. 
2. SmartBargains does not meet its initial burden of demonstrating the 
absence of a material fact dispute. 
A summary judgment movant bears the initial burden of identifying undisputed 
material facts. See Harper v. Summit Co., 2001 UT 10, U 18, 26 P-3d 193. If a moving 
party relies on pleadings, however, the nonmovant is entitled to do the same. See Gadd 
v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Utah 1984); cf Massey v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10, U 13, 
152 P.3d 312 (evidence required to respond to evidence). Indeed, all pleadings must be 
construed favorably to the nonmovant. See Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, ^ | 2, 997 
P.2d 305. If the pleadings state a claim, and there is no evidence introduced that would 
defeat it, the claim stands. See Turtle v. Olds, 2007 UT App. 10, ^  6, 155 P.3d 893. 
In Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996), this Court declined to adopt the 
reasoning of the majority in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), which shifted 
the burden of production to the nonmovant on summary judgment based on a movant's 
"no evidence" argument. See id at 443 n. 13. Noting that Celotex is not binding on the 
Utah courts as a matter of procedural law, this Court held that "[ujnless the moving party 
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meets its initial burden to present evidence establishing that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists, 'the party opposing the motion is under no obligation to demonstrate that 
there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 445 & n.13 (quoting K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 
888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994), and collecting citations). Thus, a defendant may put a 
plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations in issue either by identifying record evidence to 
support a judgment for the defendant or by showing that the allegations fail to state a 
claim. See id.; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) & (e) (requiring moving party to show lack 
of record fact issues and legal entitlement to judgment); Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 
394, U 26, 146 P.3d 886 (Bench, J., concurring) (noting Celotex is not the law in Utah). 
Here, SmartBargains5 summary judgment motion was premised almost solely on 
Overstock's pleadings. (R.421-22.) Five of the six material fact paragraphs relating to 
the tort claims relied on allegations from the Complaint; four of them did so exclusively. 
(R.421-22.) The thrust of SmartBargains' argument based on those allegations was and 
is that its pop-up ads cannot be actionable as alleged in Overstock's Complaint because 
they are pop-up ads. (R.448-54; Aplee. Br., passim.) 
Given SmartBargains' basis for its motion, Overstock is entitled to the benefit of 
all inferences from the pleadings. See Freston v. Gulf Oil Co., 525 P.2d 787, 788 (Utah 
1977). SmartBargains' reliance on Overstock's pleadings does not require Overstock to 
provide affidavit or other evidence. The question raised by the pleadings is literally 
whether the allegations state a legal claim, which Judge Noel held they did. See Gilger, 
2000 UT 23, If 2, 997 P.2d 305; R.126-28 & Add. Ex. 3. 
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If record evidence were nevertheless required to identify a material fact dispute, 
Overstock has supplied it. (R.538-40.) Overstock has specifically refuted evidence in 
SmartBargains' single affidavit and all inferences SmartBargains has attempted to draw 
from that affidavit and the pleadings. (R. 422, 515-16, 530, 538-40, 754 at 44-47; 
Opening Br., passim; supra part LA. 1.) 
Given the clear contravention of its evidence, SmartBargains is reduced to arguing 
that the facts it originally deemed undisputed and material to its motion are now "not 
material." (Aplee. Br. at 36.) This about-face has happened specifically because those 
facts have been squarely controverted. Not only did they constitute the basis for 
SmartBargains5 motion, they are independently verifiable as material. 
SmartBargains told the district court that all its pop-ups had disclaimers. (R.422.) 
SmartBargains argued this evidence directly in support of its motion. (R.449.) As it 
turned out, this representation was not true. Besides the obvious fact dispute, a jury 
would be interested in SmartBargains' credibility and corporate veracity. See Little 
America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982) (credibility is a question 
of fact for a jury); Canyon Country Store v. Bracev, 781 P.2d 414, 417-18 (Utah 1989) 
(misrepresentations create questions of fact for a jury). Moreover, since disclaimers 
themselves are not necessarily enough to avoid confusion, evidence of pop-ups with no 
disclaimers is particularly relevant. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie 
Channeling 832 F.2d 131L 1312-16 (2nd Cir. 1987). 
SmartBargains further deemed it material to represent that computer users had to 
agree to receive its pop-ups before they would be disseminated. (R.422.) This, too, was 
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shown not to be true, requiring all the same inferences and conclusions against 
SmartBargains at this juncture in the litigation process. (R.539-40.) 
SmartBargains also argued that Overstock itself has used pop-ups, repeating that 
argument in this appeal. (R.421-22, 453; Aplee. Br. at 8.) As shown below, 
SmartBargains submitted no admissible evidence of any such use from which a material 
comparison could be drawn, let alone of deceptive use. (R.503, 514-15.) An affidavit 
submitted by a SmartBargains corporate lawyer stated that her company (not her) "has 
learned" that Overstock used pop-ups in 2001 and 2002. (R.503.) Such evidence does 
not provide sufficient evidentiary or firsthand foundation for admissibility, as required for 
use on summary judgment. See Harline, 912 P.2d at 440-41 ("inadmissible evidence 
cannot be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment"); Utah R. Evid. 602, 
801-802. But assuming its admissibility for argument's sake, its undetailed conclusion is 
a slender reed of a factual argument at best, since it does little to inform the fact finder on 
the questions raised by SmartBargains' own pop-ups. 
Contrary to SmartBargains' characterization, Overstock does not seek to prohibit 
all pop-ups, nor does it sue simply because pop-ups were used. The gravamen of the 
Complaint is the use of deceptive advertisements aimed specifically at Overstock and 
designed overtly to suggest affiliation where none existed. As in any medium, 
competition is allowed only if it is fair. See, e.g., Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Ctrs., 
Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 965 (Utah 1968). Nothing about SmartBargains' hearsay testimony 
would suggest Overstock ever acted unfairly by engaging in conduct similar to 
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SmartBargains' focused, color-coordinated palming off. This and all issues 
SmartBargains raises are inherently factual. 
Summary judgment cannot appropriately be granted on a disputed fact record. 
SmartBargains fails to carry its burden of showing no material fact dispute. Reversal and 
remand is therefore required. 
B. Overstock's unfair competition claim is cognizable under Utah 
common law. 
1. Utah law should be correctly applied. 
This Court assures the law in Utah is correctly applied. See United States Fuel 
Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, ^ 93 70 P.3d 945. 
SmartBargains argues that, under that law, a defendant's intent is irrelevant in an unfair 
competition analysis. (Aplee. Br. at 19-21.) But the authorities, including this Court, 
have observed just the opposite. 
While the tort of unfair competition seeks to prevent "a representation likely to 
deceive or mislead prospective purchasers," the actor's intent, conduct, and ultimate 
likelihood of effecting a deception are all closely interdependent, and their analysis is 
inextricably bound up together. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 4 & 
cmt. d (1995 & Supp. 2005). Given the inherently difficult nature of ascertaining state of 
mind and likelihood of confusion, the courts have permitted fact inferences to assist 
plaintiffs, variously allowing evidence of conduct to demonstrate intent, allowing intent 
to inform the nature of the conduct, allowing both conduct and intent to prove likelihood 
of deception, and vice versa. 
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The Restatement notes, for example: 
Although an intent to deceive is not an element of the cause of action under 
this Section, evidence that the representation was in fact intended to mislead 
prospective purchasers with respect to the identity of the actor or the source, 
sponsorship, or approval of the goods or services may justify an inference that 
deception is likely. When such evidence is adduced, the burden may properly 
shift to the actor to demonstrate that deception is unlikely despite the attempt to 
deceive. The subjective intent of the actor is also relevant to an award of 
monetary relief.... 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 4 cmt. d (1995 & Supp. 2005). 
Similarly, in Stewart's Sandwiches, Inc. v. Seward's Cafeteria, Inc., 60 F.2d 981, 
982 (S.D.N.Y. 1932), the court gave plaintiff the inference of confusing effect when the 
defendant's conduct was a deliberate attempt to make its sign look like the plaintiffs. 
See id. at 982. The court observed that "[i]ntentional simulation having been established, 
any doubts as to probable and actual confusion will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff." 
This Court, too, in Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass'n v. Cloverleaf Dairy, 151 P.2d 710 
(Utah 1944), quoted prior case law and relied on a long string of authorities in observing 
that the defendant's conduct informed whether the defendant was attempting to pass off 
its goods as the plaintiffs: 
"The test of unfair competition is whether the maker or seller of the goods is, by 
his conduct, passing off his goods as the complainant's goods, and not whether the 
public is likely to be deceived as to who is the maker or seller of the goods.'" 
Id at 717 (quoting Kawneer Co. v. McHugh, 51 F.2d 560, 564 (M.D. Pa. 1931)). "It is 
enough to require an injunction if [defendant] knowingly places in the hands of a retailer 
an instrument which may deceive the public." Id. at 716. 
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The Hi-Land decision emphasized that intent alone proves nothing without tying it 
to the conduct in question. Thus, "an intent to simulate plaintiffs [product] and get his 
business, is not alone sufficient. But defendant must adopt the similar [product] to 
accomplish that act, and it must result in a deception or probable deception of the public." 
Id. (collecting citations). Nevertheless, a defendant may be "chargeable with knowledge 
of the inevitable consequences of such conduct, and so is open to the inference that it 
intends its products to be confused with and mistaken for complainant's product." Id. at 
717 (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, as Overstock showed in its opening brief, 
"[t]he focus is the defendant's intent and actions - not, as the district court suggested, 
merely the effect." (Opening Br. at 11; see also R.531, making same argument below.) 
This Court's opinion in Hi-Land is highly instructive on how to properly apply the 
common law analysis. The defendant sold milk in stores, in proximity to the plaintiffs, 
using cartons with similar color schemes, design, and dress to those of the plaintiff. See 
Hi-Land, 151 P.2d at 712-16. A person looking carefully at the two cartons could readily 
distinguish between them. See id at 713, 714. Indeed, the defendant's brand name 
appeared on its cartons. See id. The defendant argued that the reasons for the similarities 
were purely economic; that it did not seek to deceive or mislead plaintiffs customers; 
and that it had adopted the color-and-pattern scheme based on what advertising experts 
said was the most attractive and effective approach for display purposes. See id. at 716. 
On appeal, this Court reversed a judgment for the defendant, ordered an 
injunction, and remanded. 
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First, the Court noted that the ability to readily distinguish between plaintiffs and 
defendant's products "is not the test to be applied in these cases." Id. at 714. Rather, 
"when all the facts are considered together, do they show an intent, an effort, an act so 
closely simulating the design and dress of plaintiff s cartons as to cause confusion or 
mislead the buying public into taking Cloverleaf milk when they intended to take and 
purchase Hi-Land milk?" Id. at 716. "It is not necessary that defendant's carton be an 
exact replica of those used by plaintiff before their use may be enjoined. There need only 
be such a resemblance between the dress of the competing goods as would or might 
deceive the ordinary purchaser." Id. at 714. 
Second, the fact that defendant put its name on the carton was not "of itself 
sufficient" to prevent liability. Id. "[W]here a competitor in packing, labeling, dressing, 
use of colors, and arrangement of type so closely simulates the goods of another, 
although using a different name as to enable persons handling such goods to palm them 
off on customers, as the goods of such rival, it is unfair competition...." Id. at 716. It is 
not necessarily the individual elements of the defendant's package that is dispositive, it is 
"the combinations of color and design," "the combination of all of these features," and 
the "overall impression." Id. at 715. '"Similarity of appearance is determined on the 
basis of the total effect of the designation, rather than on a comparison of individual 
features.'" Id at 717 (quoting Restatement of Tort § 729(a) cmt.). 
Third, the case was decided based on an extensively developed fact record. See 
id., passim. The Court did not accept at face value the defendant's arguments as to its 
intent but looked to all the facts and circumstances in making its determination. 
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In addition to illustrating how intent is analyzed, the principles drawn from this 
Court's opinion are directly pertinent to this case and demonstrate the need for a reversal. 
The design, appearance, and overall impression given by the SmartBargains pop-ups, 
using a similar color scheme, typeset, look, and feel as Overstock's website, are at least 
as similar in appearance as the competing milk cartons in Hi-Land, if not significantly 
more so. SeeR.7, 538; cf 151 P.2d at 713, 712-16. At first blush, they appear related. 
They need not be exact replicas, and they need not use the plaintiffs trademark. They 
subject SmartBargains to liability even if they are readily distinguishable upon close 
examination. If, as SmartBargains argues, its conduct is the principal focus of the 
inquiry, then all its conduct - including the recognized need but failure to add a 
disclaimer to all its pop-ups - is evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that these pop-ups are actionable. The totality of the facts, including the colors, 
design, and dress, call for factual proceedings to address this claim. SmartBargains has 
advanced the very arguments that this Court rejected in Hi-Land. 
On the record now before this Court, the various and competing facts and 
inferences call for a jury to sort out, weigh, and decide. SmartBargains' own legal 
citations recognize as much. (Aplee. Br. at 19, 20.) According to SmartBargains' cases, 
liability may be premised on "probable deception of the public," or deception of a 
"reasonable person." Hi-Land, 151 P.2d at 717; William H. Wise & Co. v. Doubldav, 
Doran & Co., 60 N.Y.S.2d 719, 724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946). These are quintessential jury 
inquiries. See, e.g.. Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, ^  18, 28 P.3d 1271 ("weighing 
reasonableness . . . necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude summary 
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judgment."); Drexel Enters. Inc., 312 F.2d at 528 ("determination of whether or not 
[products] are confusingly similar is a question of fact"). Summary judgment was not 
properly granted and should be reversed. 
2. The WhenU cases do not inform the issues in this appeal. 
However much SmartBargains parses the three WhenU cases, they are not on 
point. Their holdings do not speak to the issues before this Court. Their usefulness lies 
principally in their confirmation that important legal conclusions on substantial claims 
should not be reached without a properly developed record. 
The Lanham Act claims in the When-U cases were dismissed based on an 
insufficient showing of trademark "use in commerce" to demonstrate Lanham Act 
violations, including Lanham Act unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). See J^ 
800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 (2d Cir. 2005); U-Haul Inf 1, 
Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 724-25 (E.D. Va. 2003). To establish a 
valid common-law claim for unfair competition, a plaintiff is not required to prove "use 
in commerce." See, e.g., Beard v. Board of Educ, 16 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1932). Even 
if discrete elements of the claims were identical - and SmartBargains has made no 
showing that they are - the Lanham Act has not preempted or otherwise eliminated state 
law unfair competition jurisprudence. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. 
Supp. 2d 393, 404 (N.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing plaintiffs Lanham Act claims with 
prejudice, but declining to decide plaintiffs state law unfair competition claim); 1-800 
Contacts, 414 F.3d at 402 n.4, 403, 412-13 (same). 
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The "likelihood of confusion" analysis in Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 
293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich.), is unhelpful dicta. The court specifically noted: 
"[T]he Court's holding the defendant has not impermissibly used plaintiffs' marks makes 
it unnecessary to reach the issue of likelihood of confusion." Id. at 764. The court 
examined the issue anyway to show that "plaintiffs' failure to establish this element of 
their claim further weakens their request for injunctive relief." Id. The court's analysis, 
however, related to the likelihood of confusion regarding the plaintiffs trademarks - an 
issue not before this Court. See id. Even so, the relevant Sixth Circuit analysis was a 
highly factual, multi-factor inquiry in which "each case presents its own complex set of 
circumstances and not all of the[] factors may be particularly helpful in any given case." 
Id. (quoting Sixth Circuit case law). 
Setting aside the fact that the WhenU cases decided distinct legal issues, their 
decisions rested on fully developed fact records in considering highly fact-dependent 
records. Consequently, the courts were justified in saying what they said about the 
computer and technical issues before them, having considered live and deposition 
testimony, expert witness conclusions, and technical specifications. See id. at 737-56 
(entering dozens of detailed findings of fact based on multiple affidavits, deposition and 
trial testimony, and documentary evidence); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. When-U.com, 309 F. 
Supp.2d 467, 473-483 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same), rev'd and remanded, 414 F.3d 400 (2nd 
Cir. 2005); U-Haul, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 724-25 (discussing facts related to how software 
functioned). 
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SmartBargains, in contrast, is not justified in simply pointing to those cases and 
claiming salient comparisons, as the record evidence does not indisputably establish a 
link between the records developed there and the instant case. SmartBargains' 
conclusory arguments are not enough. Case law decisions are only persuasive to the 
extent they are based on identifiably similar material facts. At the very least, it would be 
presumptuous in a highly dynamic technical world to draw conclusions about the 
identical nature of the relevant technology from the mere fact that the WhenU decisions 
also used pop-ups. 
More to the point, however, the WhenU cases did not consider the factually 
intense question of these SmartBargains pop-ups aimed at Overstock. That alone 
materially distinguishes the cases. Overstock's challenge is to the deceiving nature of 
SmartBargains' advertisements and not to pop-ups qua pop-ups. 
3. Brick and mortar cases are analogous and helpful. 
SmartBargains denigrates Overstock for providing a survey of analogous 
jurisprudence from the world of brick and mortar. These, of course, are the types of 
cases that appeared historically in the pre-internet world. 
It is the litigants' duty on appeal to inform the Court with appropriate contextual 
case law. These are not "new arguments" raised on appeal. The cases demonstrate that 
fundamental principles of unfair competition law long applied in the common law courts 
are directly analogous to this case. The rules do not change simply because the medium 
has changed. 
360980v.2 15 
Overstock has not cited these cases in a vacuum but has applied their principles 
directly to the facts of this appeal. (Opening Br. at 23.) Rather than addressing the 
principles, SmartBargains criticizes the discussion of the cases and makes factual 
arguments unsupported by the record. (Aplee. Br. at 29-30.) This appeal presents the 
opportunity for the Court to reaffirm that legal principles of fairness apply in the virtual 
business world just as they always have under the traditional business model. 
The instant appeal stands today where the Hi-Land case stood sixty-three years 
ago. That case came about because the milk industry's manufacturing and advertising 
methods moved from bottles to cartons. See 151 P.2d at 712. With the change in 
medium came a change in advertising approaches and a dispute between competitors. 
This Court's foray into the dispute in 1944 established that the rules were the same in the 
then-new era of manufacturing as they had been in the old. 
The instant case seeks the same ruling under equivalent circumstances. Unless the 
World Wide Web truly is the Wild West, where basic rules of fair play and substantial 
justice will not work, the common law of unfair competition applies here just as it does to 
milk cartons and bottles. 
In sum, both the facts and the law demonstrate the need for reversal on dismissal 
of the unfair competition claim. 
C. SmartBargains5 tortious interference argument is factual. 
1. The "improper purpose" element is properly pleaded and supported. 
In moving for summary judgment, SmartBargains did not submit evidence of its 
intent nor identify as an undisputed material fact that its intent was pure competition. 
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(R.421-22.) Its only support for its position was the argument of counsel. (R.754 at 36.) 
Thus, Overstock's pleadings on this point remain unchallenged and are not subject to 
summary dismissal. See supra part I.A.2. 
Given the unrefuted allegations of the Complaint, SmartBargains' motion 
necessarily fails on the "improper purpose" prong. As Judge Noel properly concluded, 
the Complaint contained "sufficient allegations" as a matter of law to support a claim for 
tortious interference. (R.l 18-19, 127.) SmartBargains submitted no evidence beyond the 
pleadings that would call for a different outcome. 
The only "evidence" SmartBargains points to now in support of its proper-purpose 
argument is a representative pop-up contained within Overstock's initial pleadings. 
(R.7.) Judge Noel had the very same pop-up before him when he denied SmartBargains a 
judgment based on those very pleadings. (R.l 26-28.) The pop-up itself is certainly 
subject to numerous competing inferences about its purpose. See supra part LA. 1. 
Beyond that, SmartBargains offers nothing but attorney factual argument that, at best, 
would create a jury issue. 
Overstock's Complaint alleged, inter alia, that SmartBargains acted "with the 
intent to confuse and deceive customers as to the source of SmartBargains' services." 
(R.9) SmartBargains' actions "erode the attractiveness of shopping on the Overstock's 
Web site." (R.9.) They further "disrupt Overstock's efforts to create a 'user friendly' 
site." (R.9.) They threaten Overstock's reputation, customer relationships, and economic 
viability. (R.9.) These allegations were incorporated into Overstock's claim for tortious 
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interference and the inferences argued below in opposition to summary judgment on the 
"improper purpose" prong. (R.l 1, 534-35, 754 at 50.) 
SmartBargains' argument about its pure competitive intent is neither supported by 
affidavit nor, frankly, believable. Its suggestion now to this Court that its use of a color 
scheme exactly matching Overstock's is "coincidental" strains credulity. Among other 
things, SmartBargains has already been shown to have misrepresented facts by claiming 
that all its pop-ups contained disclaimers - when they did not - and by claiming that 
users received pop-ups only if they agreed to them - when they did not. (R.422, 538-40.) 
Other evidence in the record shows SmartBargains representing that it had ceased using 
the pop-ups - when it had not - followed by a subsequent retreat from that representation. 
(R.611 at Exs. A, D-F.) A jury is best suited to sift through SmartBargains5 competing 
versions of facts, including its purported purpose in directing matching pop-ups designed 
overtly to project an appearance of affiliation. See Canyon Country Stores, 781 P.2d at 
417-18 (misrepresentation and intent to deceive are questions of fact for the jury). 
SmartBargains argues that its inclusion of disclaimer language "conclusively 
demonstrates an intent to compete, not deceive." (Aplee. Br. at 33.) This is an incorrect 
statement of the law. See Home Box Office, 832 F.2d at 131 (holding that even 
disclaimers may be insufficient to avoid confusion); Hi-Land, supra (holding 
distinguishable nature of competing articles is not dispositive). More poignantly, record 
evidence shows SmartBargains did not always include disclaimer language. (R.538.) 
Thus, SmartBargains itself demonstrates the fact issue. In all events, the disclaimers it 
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did use are subject to competing inferences regarding their effect given their content, 
point size, relative obscurity, or nonexistence. (R.7, 538.) 
In sum, this is not an issue that should have been summarily decided. 
2. The "improper means" element is properly pleaded and supported. 
SmartBargains fails also to demonstrate an undisputed fact record on improper 
means. Overstock has both pleaded this claim and specifically identified standards 
violated by the SmartBargains pop-ups. (R.l 1-12; Opening Br. at 25-26.) SmartBargains 
has no answer other than to argue in conclusory fashion that summary judgment is 
appropriate. (Aplee. Br. at 34-35.) 
A plaintiff is not required to plead a violation of the relevant underlying standard 
as a separate cause of action, as SmartBargains suggests. (Aplee. Br. at 35 n.15.) Nor is 
Overstock required to identify separately a trade standard when both statutory and 
common law standards have been identified. (Aplee. Br. at 35 n.15.) The "improper 
means" requirement is met when pleading and proof show that enunciated legal standards 
of commercial fairness have been violated. See St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 201 (Utah 1991). 
SmartBargains suggests repeatedly that Overstock's claim is based solely on the 
fact that SmartBargains used pop-up advertising. (R.34.) SmartBargains' response to 
this straw-man argument is that pop-ups are per se fair because they are pop-ups. This 
does not represent a correct characterization of this dispute now or ever. 
This case focuses on SmartBargains' pop-ups directed specifically at Overstock's 
website - their purpose, character, content, and appearance. Overstock no more wants to 
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prohibit all pop-ups than it wants to prohibit all billboards. But just because billboards 
may be a proper means for delivering fair advertising does not mean that all billboard 
advertising is fair competition. Regardless of the medium, if unfair similarities are used, 
an action will lie. 
On this record, Overstock's tortious interference claim should proceed along with 
its unfair competition claim. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S 56(f) DECISION EXCEEDED THE BOUNDS 
OF THE COURT'S REASONABLE DISCRETION. 
In the event the summary judgment ruling is not reversed on its merits, the Court 
should reverse in all events under Rule 56(f). Overstock was unfairly prejudiced by 
SmartBargains5 procedural machinations preventing proper discovery from taking place. 
SmartBargains suggests it fully responded to "all of Overstock's discovery 
requests and produced all documents." (Aplee. Br. at 44.) The record says otherwise. 
(R.611 at Ex. H-L.) SmartBargains did not timely produce the documents that Overstock 
requested and did not produce any documents before it filed its summary judgment 
motion. (R.121, 334-36, 389-95, 412, 611 at Exs. H-J, M; record citations in Opening Br. 
at 3.) Without SmartBargains' discovery responses and documents, any follow-up 
discovery, including third-party discovery, was effectively forestalled. Even so, the 
discovery period was not concluded, and substantial discovery was left to do. (R.611.) 
The Court's ruling in Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 311 (Utah 1984), is directly on 
point. This Court reversed a lower court determination denying plaintiffs the opportunity 
to conduct further discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment. See id at 315. The 
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Court held that where a moving party has not complied with discovery requests, it is an 
abuse of discretion to grant a summary judgment motion. See id. The Court explained 
that "while sufficiency of time to utilize discovery proceedings prior to a summary 
judgment hearing is an important factor to consider under rule 56(f), it is no more so than 
the fact that discovery was never afforded an appropriate response." Id. at 313-14 
(emphasis added). The Court consequently held that the trial court should have ordered a 
continuance to permit discovery or should have denied the underlying substantive motion 
without prejudice. See id. at 315. 
The Cox court relied on Strand v. Associated Students of the University of Utah, 
561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977), where the party moving for summary judgment had not 
produced its supporting affidavits until four days prior to the motion's scheduled hearing. 
The facts sought were in the possession and control of the moving party. This Court 
reversed the order for summary judgment, reasoning that the plaintiff did not have 
sufficient time to conduct discovery. See id. at 194. 
Cox also relied on Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball 572 P.2d 376 (Utah 1977), where 
the party opposing a motion for summary judgment had initiated discovery proceedings 
prior to the filing of the motion and had not received any response. Less than a week 
before the scheduled hearing on the motion, the party filed a motion to strike the 
summary judgment motion on the grounds that discovery had not been completed. 
Reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment, the Court held that "the 
granting of the motion for summary judgment was premature [because] discovery was 
not then complete." Id. at 377. 
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Applying a liberal construction to plaintiffs Rule 56(f) motion, as required by 
Cox and its progeny, this Court should reverse. 
SmartBargains did not provide Overstock with an "appropriate response" to its 
discovery requests. The documents that SmartBargains held onto and produced only 
after filing its summary judgment motion - and only after Overstock filed its responsive 
memorandum - contained extensive redactions that make impossible any reasonable 
interpretation. (R.509, 611 at Ex. J-K.) Moreover, Overstock's counsel was not able to 
communicate the documents' contents to Overstock in light of the "attorneys' eyes only" 
designation. (R.611 at Ex. K.) Thus, even having received the untimely productions, 
Overstock was not able to further develop facts to support its claims and respond 
completely to SmartBargains' premature motion for summary judgment. 
Overstock supported its 56(f) request with signed attorney pleadings and 
ultimately an attorney affidavit. (R.541-45, 610-11.) The district judge had all of these 
before him when he ruled. (R.706.) This and the timing of SmartBargains' delayed 
production are sufficient to answer any procedural contention SmartBargains now raises 
under 56(f). See Cox, supra (reversing based on affidavit submitted in supplemental 
objection); cf. St. Surin v. Virgin Islands Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1314 (3rd Cir. 
1994) (requiring compliance with substance of 56(f) specificity requirement); Garrett v. 
City & County of San Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987) (same). 
SmartBargains calls discovery on Overstock's tort causes of action "irrelevant," 
"unnecessary," and "cumulative." (Aplee. Br. at 43.) Presumably any defendant would 
like to prevent fact discovery by arguing as much. However, Overstock is entitled to 
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develop the record to assist in proving its claims before having to face a request for 
dismissal. See Cox, 678 P.2d at 315 (where "an adequate opportunity for discovery has 
not been provided, the motion for summary judgment should be adjourned pending the 
completion of such discovery."); cf. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 624 
(Utah 1990) (preliminary dismissal inappropriate if any facts could support the claim). 
Overstock specifically asked for discovery on disclaimers. (R.541-42.) This was 
in direct response to SmartBargains' statement of "undisputed" material fact that all its 
pop-ups included disclaimers. (R.422.) Overstock had evidence indicating the 
untruthfulness of this representation. (R.438.) Overstock was certainly entitled to probe 
this allegedly material fact on which SmartBargains based its dispositive motion. 
The snippet of colloquy cited by SmartBargains from the hearing transcript is 
incomplete. (Aplee. Br. at 44.) Overstock's counsel noted that discovery would not be 
needed in the absence of any evidence from SmartBargains creating a fact dispute: 
MR. ASHTON: I think the Court's question about the common law claims 
leads me to believe the Court recognizes my concern about that. I have a copy of 
the affidavit, which is the only evidence that's been submitted, the affidavit of Ms. 
Hill that I will be using. I'd be glad to give that to you just so it's easy, given the 
scope of the material that's been submitted. And I have a copy of at least one of 
the pop-ups that I think I gave to the Court last time we were here. There are no 
restrictive legends on this particular document, there are no indications that this is 
- this particular pop-up is not related to the Overstock website or sponsored or in 
any way affiliated with Overstock. 
THE COURT: Well, that may be sufficient to defeat the motion for 
summary judgment, but that - how does that work into the 56(f) request? 
MR. ASHTON: Oh, it does not. It does not. If- our position with regard 
to the 56(f) motion is that issues of confusion and issues of intent and issues of the 
scope of the practice need to be submitted to the Court. It is insufficient to simply 
say, "You can determine that these things are not confusing." 
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I think that, as a practical matter, the Court understands the issue as it 
relates to factual evidence, and there is no factual evidence in the record. 
(R.754 at 16-17.) Other pop-ups submitted in support of the Rule 56(f) motion further 
evidenced the need for complete discovery. (R.611 & Ex. M thereto.) Overstock did not 
retreat from its stated need for full discovery. 
Overstock specifically asked for discovery related to confusion among consumers. 
(R.541-42, 610-11.) Overstock's discovery was reasonably calculated to lead to evidence 
of actual or likely confusion. (R.611 at Ex. H.) The items it detailed in its affidavit 
likewise were all reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in 
support of this issue: the timing, types, scope, number, practice, and contents of pop-ups 
and their targets. (R.611 at 6-9.) Overstock explained with particularity why this 
discovery was necessary. (R.610-11.) Overstock reiterated at oral argument that its 56(f) 
motion pertained "directly to the question of confusion, intent to utilize the website of 
Overstock, and the two common law claims that are included as a part[] of the summary 
judgment motion." (R.754 at 4.) 
Finally, SmartBargains' argument that its intent is "irrelevant" to the unfair 
competition claim runs counter to Utah law. See supra part I.B. 1. The intent of a 
defendant in planning, designing, targeting, and disseminating its deceivingly similar ads 
would, on its face, be highly relevant to the claims in this case. Overstock, having 
already received a district court ruling that its common law allegations stated a claim, 
should have been allowed a chance to develop its record completely before a premature 
and repetitive dispositive motion threw out its well-pleaded claims. 
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CONCLUSION 
For each of these reasons, individually and collectively, the judgment dismissing 
the tort claims should be reversed and the case remanded for full evidentiary 
development and consideration on the merits of both remaining claims. 
DATED this 18th day of June, 2007. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & 
MCCARTHY 
By: 
By: 
Stephen K. Christiansen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
360980v.2 25 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 18th day of June, 2007,1 caused to be mailed, first-
class postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT to: 
David J. Jordan 
David L. Mortensen 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904 
360980v.2 
Addendum 
1 
REPLY ARGUMENT CROSS-REFERENCE INDEX 
SmartBargains' Contentions 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
A.l. 
Nonmovants may not rely solely on 
pleadings (pp. 14-15) 
A.l.a. 
SmartBargains' ads are not actionable 
(pp. 15-17) 
A.l.a. 
The WhenU cases control (pp. 17-19) 
A. Lb. 
Intent is irrelevant to unfair competition 
(PP-19-21) 
A.l.c. 
Pop-ups are per se not deceptive, as 
found in the WhenU cases (pp.21-24) 
A.l.d. 
The WhenU decisions are on point 
(pp.24-29) 
A.l.e. 
Traditional business cases are 
inapplicable (pp.29-30) | 
Overstock's Reply 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
I.A.2. 
Nonmovants may rely solely on 
pleadings if movants do and are entitled 
to all inferences (pp.4-5) 
I.A.I. &I.A.2. 
SmartBargains5 arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
Ads must be fair regardless of the 
medium (pp.7-8) 
I.B.L 
SmartBargains' claims are cognizable 
(pp.8-13) 
I.B.2. 
The WhenU cases are different (pp.13-
15) 
I.B.I. 
Intent is bound up in the proper analysis 
(pp.8-12) 
I.A.2. & I.B.2. & 1.C2. 
The ads are actionable because they're 
deceptive, not merely because they're 
pop-ups (pp.7-8, 15, 19-20) 
I.B.2. 
The WhenU cases are not on point 
(pp.13-15) 
I.B.3. 
Traditional business cases are helpful 
(pp. 15-16) 1 
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SmartBargains5 Contentions 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
A.2. 
There was no evidence of improper 
purpose/means (p.31) 
A.2.a. 
SmartBargains' purpose was pure 
competition (pp.31-33) 
A.2.b. 
Pop-ups are not an improper means 
(pp.34-35) 
1 
Overstock's Reply 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
IA.2. 
Nonmovants may rely solely on 
pleadings if movants do and are entitled 
to all inferences (pp.4-5) 
LCI. 
"Improper purpose" was pleaded and 
argued (pp. 16-19) 
I.C.I. 
A jury need not believe SmartBargains' 
self-serving statements on this record 
(PP. 18-19) 
I.A.1.&I.A.2. 
SmartBargains5 arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
LCI. 
A jury need not believe SmartBargains' 
self-serving statements on this record 
(pp. 18-19) 
I.A.2. &I.B.2. & 1.C2. 
The ads are actionable because they're 
deceptive, not merely because they're 
pop-ups (pp.7-85 15, 19-20) 
IA.1.&I.A.2. 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.C.2. 
"Improper means" was properly 
pleaded and supported (pp. 19-20) 
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SmartBargains' Contentions 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
AJL 
The order was supported by the record 
(P-35) 
A.3.a. 
There are no material fact issues (pp.36-
37) 
A.3.b. 
Pop-up ads are not deceptive as a matter 
of law (pp.37-3 8) 
A.3.b. 
Evidence supports the ruling below 
(pp.3 8-39) 
A.4. 
Judge Noel's decision is irrelevant 
(pp.40-42) 
_ 
Overstock did not identify discovery it 
needed (pp.42-43) 
_ 
Disclaimer discovery is irrelevant & 
unnecessary (pp.43-44) 
_ 
Overstock failed to conduct discovery 
(pp.44-45) 
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Overstock's Reply 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
I.A.I. 
The order was not supported by the 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.A.I. &I.A.2.& I.B.I. & I.C.I. & 
I.C.2. 
There are numerous material fact issues 
(pp.2-45 5-8,8-13, 16-20) 
I.A.I. &I.A.2. 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.A.2.&I.B.2. & 1.C2. 
The ads are actionable because they're 
deceptive, not merely because they're 
pop-ups (pp.7-8, 15, 19-20) 
I.A.I. &I.A.Z 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.A.2.&I.C.f 
Judge Noel's decision was right (pp.5-6, 
_17) 
IL 
Overstock identified discovery it 
needed (p.22-24) 
IL 
Disclaimer discovery is relevant and 
necessary (p.23) 
IL 
Overstock was thwarted in conducting 
discovery (pp.20-22) 
SmartBargains' Contentions 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
Overstock did not seek discovery on 
confusion (pp.45-46) 
56(f) motions are denied on purely legal 
issues (p.46) 
Discovery on intent is irrelevant (p.47) 
Overstock's Reply 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
~K 
Overstock conducted discovery on 
confusion (p.24) 
I.A.1.&IA.Z 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.B.I. & II. 
Intent is bound up in the proper analysis 
(pp.8-12) 
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SmartBargains' Contentions 
(by Footnote and Page Number) 
Legitimate ads aren't unfair competition 
(pp.15-16) 
Overstock used pop-ups (p. 19) 
FIN7 
Overstock argued below it did not have 
to prove intent or confusion (p.20) 
Overstock's Reply 
(by Argument Section and Page 
Number) 
I.A.I. &I.A.2. 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
Ads must be fair regardless of the 
medium (p.7-8) 
I.B.I. 
SmartBargains' claims are cognizable 
(pp.8-13) 
I.A.1.&I.A.2. 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.A.2. & I.B.2. & 1.C2. 
The ads are actionable because they're 
deceptive, not merely because they're 
pop-ups (pp.7-8, 15, 19-20) 
I.A.2. 
SmartBargains' evidentiary foundation 
is lacking (p.7) 
I.B.I. 
Overstock's argument on intent and 
confusion are the same now as they 
were below and they properly reflect 
Utah law (pp. 8-10) 
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TNg 
Citations to complaint fail to create a 
fact issue (pp.21-22) 
Overstock's argument is contrary to the 
record (p.22) 
SmartBargains' color scheme is not 
deceptive (p.23) 
!5o 
Pop-ups are not deceptive or likely to 
cause confusion (p.29) 
TNjJ 
SmartBargains' ads are clearly marked 
(P-30) 
I.A.I. &I.A.2. 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
LA.2. 
Nonmovants may rely solely on 
pleadings if movants do and are entitled 
to all inferences (pp.4-5) 
I.A.I. &I.A.Z 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.A.I. &I.A.2~ 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.B.I. 
SmartBargains' claims are cognizable 
(pp.8-13) 
I .A.l .&I.AJ! 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.A.2. & I.B.2. & 1.C2. 
The ads are actionable because they're 
deceptive, not merely because they're 
pop-ups (pp.7-8, 15, 19-20) 
I.A.1.&I.A.2T 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
I.B.I. 
An unfair competition claim may lie 
even if the ads are clearly marked (pp. 
10-12) 
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Overstock did not allege improper 
purpose in its Complaint (p.32) 
Overstock concedes pop-ups with 
disclaimers do not demonstrate an 
improper purpose (p.33) 
TN14 
Pop-ups are not prohibited by any 
statute (p.34) 
TNJ5 
The Utah Truth in Advertising Act does 
not support a claim of improper means 
(P-35) 
The WhenU disclaimers were as 
detailed as SmartBargains' disclaimers 
(p.36) 
I.C.I. 
Overstock pleaded and argued 
"improper purpose" below (pp. 16-19) 
I.A.I. &I.A.Z 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4). SmartBargains' record 
citation does not support this argument. 
LCI. 
Overstock pleaded and argued 
"improper purpose" below (pp. 16-19) 
I.A.2. &I.B.2. & 1.C2. 
The ads are actionable because they're 
deceptive, not merely because they're 
pop-ups (pp.7-8, 15, 19-20) 
I.C.2. 
Overstock identified statutory standards 
in its opening brief (p. 19, citing 
Opening Br. at 25-26) 
I.C.2. 
Overstock identified statutory standards 
in its opening brief (p. 19, citing 
Opening Br. at 25-26) 
A plaintiff is not required to plead the 
standard as a separate cause of action 
(p. 19) 
A plaintiff is not required to identify a 
trade standard when legal standards 
have been identified (p. 19) 
LA.l.&I.A.Z 
SmartBargains' arguments are factual 
and based on a disputed record or no 
record (pp.2-4) 
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Overstock was required to identify a 
fact dispute without reference to its 
Complaint because SmartBargains filed 
a summary judgment motion (p.37) 
Whether Overstock stated a claim is 
irrelevant (p.41) 
WJ9 
Judge Hanson could correct Judge Noel 
(p.42) 
Overstock submitted a 56(f) affidavit 
after receiving the opposition 
memorandum (p.45) 
TNJo 
Overstock's 56(f) affidavit did not 
explain why additional discovery was 
necessary (p.46) 
The failure to complete discovery was 
Overstock's fault, not SmartBargains' 
(p.47) 
I.A.2. 
Nonmovants may rely solely on 
pleadings if movants do and are entitled 
to all inferences (pp.4-5) 
I.A.2. 
Nonmovants may rely solely on 
pleadings if movants do and are entitled 
to all inferences; if the pleadings state a 
claim, summary judgment is 
inappropriate (pp.4-5) 
I.A.2.&I.C.L 
Judge Noel's decision was right (pp.5-6, 
17) 
I.B.I. 
SmartBargains' claims are cognizable 
(pp.8-13) 
IE 
Overstock complied with 56(f) 
(pp.20-22) 
IL 
Overstock's 56(f) affidavit explained 
why additional discovery was necessary 
(pp.22-24) 
IL 
SmartBargains prevented appropriate 
discovery 
(pp.20-22) 
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